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MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING IN THE 
HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS:  THE 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY ALTERNATIVE TO 
ORIGINALISM 
Saul Cornell* 
INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional originalism continues to have a strong hold on American 
political discourse, and an even stronger hold on academic debate about the 
Constitution.1  The most recent development in this story is the rise of the 
“new originalism.”2  There has been a flurry of writing about new 
originalism and much of it has been critical of the theory.3  One area that 
 
*  Paul and Diane Guenther Chair in American History, Fordham University.  I would like to 
thank Ben Zipursky, Abner Greene, and the participants in The New Originalism in 
Constitutional Law Symposium for helpful comments and suggestions.  I would also like to 
thank Scott Soames, and James Kloppenberg, the participants in the Fordham Faculty 
Workshop, and the students in my constitutional history seminar for constructive comments 
on an earlier draft of this Article. 
 1. See generally JONATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS:  A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005).  On the cultural and political appeal of originalism, see 
Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009).  Randy Barnett argues that 
originalism has made “quite a splash” and “has proven to be significant in litigation.” See 
Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 412 
(2013).  Others have argued that the actual impact of originalism on American law has been 
far more modest. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1232–
42 (2012) (arguing that the number of cases actually resolved by originalist methodology 
remains small). 
 2. See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate:  A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1085 (1989).  On the notion of a new originalism, see Keith Whittington, The New 
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004).  For some leading examples of new 
originalist approaches, see Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. 
REV. 611, 613 (1999); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 
398 (2002); John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles As the 
Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 374 (2007) [hereinafter McGinnis & 
Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles]; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
Original Methods Originalism:  A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against 
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 751 (2009) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, 
Original Methods Originalism]; Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and 
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 925–26 (2009) [hereinafter Solum, Heller and 
Originalism]; Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 
07–24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 [hereinafter Solum, Semantic 
Originalism]. 
 3. For a recent critique of originalism, see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009).  A number of commentators have argued that a relatively 
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remains underdeveloped in this burgeoning literature is the relationship 
between originalism and history.4  Although originalism focuses on the 
meaning of historical texts, originalist practices are largely antithetical to 
accepted historical methodology.5  The fact that originalists have used and 
abused history in a variety of academic debates has been well documented 
by a number of scholars.6  Far less attention has been devoted to analyzing 
the flaws in the underlying historical theory associated with originalism.7  
 
anemic form of originalist argument is so pervasive in contemporary American law that the 
theory has been drained of any real power.  See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the 
New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 749–55 (2011); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, 
Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 247–67 (2009); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating 
Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory:  The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. 
L.J. 1765, 1796–99 (1997); Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-
Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 722–24 (2011). 
 4. Two important historical critiques of originalism may be found in Stephen M. 
Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, and Jack N. Rakove, Joe the 
Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 575 (2011).  This essay builds on these astute critiques of originalism.  For a 
forceful statement that rigorous originalism must adhere to the methods of intellectual 
history, see David A. Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 34 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137 (2011).  A few originalists have employed the tools of intellectual 
history to explore questions about the original meaning of the Constitution. See William 
Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 983 (2009) [hereinafter Treanor, 
Against Textualism]; William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. 
L. REV. 455 (2005) [hereinafter Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury]; Keith E. 
Whittington & Amanda Rinderle, Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill?  Marbury and the 
Construction of the Constitutional Canon, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 823 (2012). 
 5. See ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM:  
A DEBATE 57 (2011); Barnett, supra note 2, at 621; Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra 
note 2, at 112; see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:  THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 399–402 (2012); Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, 
No Legitimacy . . . No Problem:  Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. 
REV. 1551 (2012). 
 6. See Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?:  Historical Scholarship, Original 
Understanding, and Treaties As “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 
(1999); Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (2004).  On the historical problems with Second Amendment 
scholarship, particularly in District of Columbia v. Heller, see David Thomas Konig, Why 
the Second Amendment Has a Preamble:  Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture 
of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295 (2009); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism:  Heller As Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 
272–73 (2008); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of 
Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness:  The Supreme 
Court and Gun Control, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 38–40; see also Saul Cornell, 
Originalism on Trial:  The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 
OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 639–40 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive:  Originalism As Popular 
Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008). 
 7. Much originalism takes the form of law office history.  Such work is typically result-
oriented, generally ignores recent scholarly developments in the relevant historiography, and 
approaches historical texts in an anachronistic manner.  For critiques of various aspects of 
law office history, see generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE:  A HISTORICAL INQUIRY (2007); Matthew J. 
Festa, Applying a Usable Past:  The Use of History in Law, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 479 
(2008); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court:  An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119; 
Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387 (2003).  Some 
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This Article considers the problems of originalist methodology in light of 
recent work in intellectual history and the philosophy of language.8 
Part I of this Article explores the contextualist methodology favored by 
most contemporary American intellectual historians.  Although there is 
considerable methodological eclecticism among intellectual historians 
working in American universities, the field of American intellectual history 
has coalesced around a common set of interpretive practices.9  In contrast to 
recent work in originalism that generally eschews a focus on 
communicative intent, recent writing in both the philosophy of language 
and intellectual history remains committed to linking meaning with 
intention.10  While such inquiries necessarily start with the semantic 
meaning of texts, in many cases, the words on the page often 
underdetermine meaning.  Rather than fix constitutional meaning, readers 
of the original Constitution would have drawn on a range of interpretive 
rules and background assumptions to help them make sense of the meaning 
of the text.  Constitutional theory must move beyond a focus on the 
semantic content of legal texts to an analysis of the historical pragmatics of 
constitutional communication.11  It is impossible to reconstruct an accurate 
account of what the Constitution or other legal texts meant in the eighteenth 
century without some understanding of these pragmatic processes.   
Part II analyzes the philosophical and historical flaws in contemporary 
originalist theory and practice.  There are many different strains of 
originalism, but all of them suffer from similar historical problems.  Most 
 
originalists have countered that history and originalism seek different types of meaning. See 
Solum’s argument in BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 5, at 54.  Other originalists have waged 
a counterattack and argued that historians are prone to engage in forms of history office 
law—a sort of mirror image of law office history, an approach that fails to understand legal 
and constitutional ideas. See Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right To 
Carry Arms (I):  Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 
AM. U. L. REV. 585 (2012); see also Nicholas J. Johnson, Rights Versus Duties:  History 
Department Lawyering, and the Incoherence of Justice Stevens’s Heller Dissent, 39 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1503 (2012) (presenting a somewhat more petulant argument).  Robert 
Post notes that historians are typically most comfortable with externalist explanations.  Legal 
scholars are steeped in doctrinal analysis, which is a type of internalist explanation. See 
Robert C. Post, Defaming Public Officials:  On Doctrine and Legal History, 1987 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 539.  Post recognizes that internalist and externalist forms of analysis are 
both essential in constitutional and legal history. Id. at 548. 
 8. See generally PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW (Andrei 
Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011); Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal Language, 
21 RATIO JURIS 423 (2008); A.P. Martinich, A Moderate Logic of the History of Ideas, 73 J. 
HIST. IDEAS 609 (2012). 
 9. See generally James T. Kloppenberg, Thinking Historically:  A Manifesto of 
Pragmatic Hermeneutics, 9 MODERN INTELL. HIST. 201 (2012); cf. William W. Fisher III, 
Texts and Contexts:  The Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of 
Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1997) (concluding that the field lacked a 
common method). 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. Scott Soames, What Vagueness and Inconsistency Tell Us About Interpretation, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW, supra note 8, at 31, 35.  On 
pragmatics, see Kepa Korta & John Perry, Pragmatics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Mar. 21, 
2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/pragmatics/. 
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originalists assume the existence of a constitutional consensus where none 
existed and gather evidence in an arbitrary and highly selective fashion.12  
Early American history was not characterized by broad agreement on 
constitutional matters, but rather was deeply divided on a variety of 
fundamental issues about constitutional interpretation and meaning.  
Selecting texts and evaluating their probative value requires some 
understanding of how texts were produced, distributed, and consumed by 
different groups in the Founding era.  For originalists all texts are created 
equal, an approach that has facilitated ideological distortions and generated 
a deeply flawed account of America’s constitutional past.13 
Part III analyzes the originalist methodology employed in District of 
Columbia v. Heller.  Although praised by originalists and hailed by gun 
rights activists, the decision has been vigorously attacked from scholars at 
both ends of the academic political spectrum.  Rather than vindicate 
originalism, Justice Scalia’s methodology provides a catalogue of the types 
of errors, distortions, and manipulations that originalism encourages.  
Justice Scalia’s use of dictionaries rests on a set of false assumptions about 
the relationship between early dictionaries and the history of the English 
language.  These early dictionaries were not compiled according to modern 
scholarly rules, but were idiosyncratic reflections of their authors who 
generally sought to prescribe, not describe, contemporary patterns of usage.  
Even more troubling is Justice Scalia’s misreading of the Quaker opposition 
to bearing arms.  Quakers (Members of the Religious Society of Friends) 
did not oppose bearing guns, but they did oppose bearing arms, a vital 
distinction blurred by Justice Scalia’s ahistorical approach.  Rather than cite 
Quaker sources to support his warped view of history, Justice Scalia 
substitutes his own interpretation of what Quakers believed for the actual 
beliefs of eighteenth century Friends.  Finally, Justice Scalia compounds his 
distorted reading of history by ignoring Founding-era legal rules and 
applying interpretive conventions drawn from decades after the framing of 
the Second Amendment to justify reading the text backwards.  This is an 
interpretive move that allows him to effectively discount the preamble’s 
discussion of a well-regulated militia. 
Part IV examines the original debate over freedom of the press in 1788.  
Federalists and Anti-Federalists used different rules of construction to make 
sense of what the words “freedom of the press” meant.14  Adopting the 
 
 12. On the problem of multiple intents and constitutional meaning, see generally JACK 
N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1997), and Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204 (1980).  On the tensions within Anti-Federalism, particularly between elite and 
popular opposition to the Constitution, see SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS:  ANTI-
FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA 1788–1828 (1999). 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. A number of originalists distinguish between the task of interpretation, which is 
what the Constitution meant, and construction, which is the application of constitutional 
meaning to legal problems. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional 
Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 455–57 (2013); Lawrence B. Solum, The 
Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010).  The Founding 
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rules favored by most originalists for reading constitutional texts would 
require overturning core elements of First Amendment doctrine.  In short, a 
rigorous and neutral application of originalist theory leads to highly 
undesirable outcomes. 
Part V briefly contrasts the more sophisticated model provided by 
contemporary intellectual history with the flawed approach to the past 
favored by originalists.  Abandoning originalist method in favor of 
intellectual history would encourage scholars and judges to grapple with the 
different meanings that various provisions of the Constitution had at the 
Founding moment.  Building on this more solid historical foundation would 
facilitate a more serious debate over the proper role of history in the future 
of constitutional theory and adjudication. 
I.  INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND THE PROMISE OF PRAGMATICS 
In a recent essay on the state of American intellectual history, Harvard 
historian James Kloppenberg provides a concise overview of this vibrant 
field.15  Kloppenberg notes that most contemporary American intellectual 
historians have written about ideas and beliefs with three guiding precepts 
in mind.  Intellectual historians, he observes, strive to write about ideas as 
“embodied, embedded, and extended.”16 
While ideas were once studied in a disembodied way, most intellectual 
historians now believe that historical texts must be connected to the 
intentions of the individual authors who created them.  In the case of 
anonymous authors and collective authorship, most intellectual historians 
would follow David Hollinger’s model of rooting texts within particular 
discursive communities.17  It is easy to see how this new model of 
intellectual history differs from the classic approach to the history of ideas 
found in the pioneering studies of scholars such as Perry Miller.  In his 
pathbreaking study, The New England Mind, Miller wove together different 
Puritan texts to create a single Puritan mind.18  His emphasis lay on 
systematic thought, such as Ramist logic and the “Augustinan strain of 
piety.”19  Although more recent studies of Puritanism have not abandoned 
 
era’s own understanding of construction seems rather different.  In the Founding era, 
“construction” referred to the complex process of discovering the meaning of a legal text.  
The term appears hundreds of times in Founding-era cases and in legal writing. See, e.g., 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 
419 (1793).  In contrast to Solum, many within the Founding era recognized that 
construction was as much a political process as it was a legal one.  For a good illustration in 
the context of freedom of the press, see TUNIS WORTMAN, A TREATISE CONCERNING 
POLITICAL ENQUIRY AND THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 228 (N.Y., George Forman 1800). 
 15. See generally Kloppenberg, supra note 9; see also James T. Kloppenberg, 
Intellectual History, Democracy and the Culture of Irony, in THE STATE OF U.S. HISTORY 
199 (Melvyn Stokes ed., 2002). 
 16. Kloppenberg, supra note 9, at 201. 
 17. DAVID A. HOLLINGER, IN THE AMERICAN PROVINCE:  STUDIES IN THE HISTORY AND 
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF IDEAS (1985). 
 18. PERRY MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND:  THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1954). 
 19. Id. at 3. 
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theology, the field has adapted the insights of cultural history, bringing a 
fresh perspective to one of the most studied fields in American history.  
David Hall’s work is representative of the recent trends in contemporary 
intellectual history.  His analysis of the Puritan diarist Samuel Sewall 
devotes as much attention to the way Puritans in New England experienced 
darkness as it does to the traditional questions that vexed Miller, issues such 
as covenant theology.20 
The notion of embedding intellectual history in multiple contexts has 
shifted the focus away from an entirely internalist approach to ideas.21  The 
impact of this approach on legal history has been especially profound.  
Studies of legal doctrine or Supreme Court–centered histories have not 
disappeared, but many newer studies strive to move beyond these sources to 
illuminate constitutionalism outside of the courts and other aspects of 
popular constitutionalism.  The theory of popular sovereignty figures 
prominently in standard constitutional histories of the pre–Civil War era. 
Typically this body of scholarship focuses on the ideas of legal and political 
elites.  Important events such as the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Dred Scott v. 
Sandford case, or the Lincoln-Douglas debates once framed the scholarly 
discussion of this issue.22  By contrast, legal historian Elizabeth Dale uses a 
sensational antebellum murder case to analyze the way ordinary Americans 
understood issues of law and constitutionalism in the same era, providing a 
bottom-up perspective to complement the traditional top-down approach.23 
The practice of much traditional intellectual history was analogous to 
rummaging among the volumes in the library of the great thinkers of the 
past.  A classic model of such an inquiry is H. Trevor Colburn’s Lamp of 
Experience, a book that charted the role of historical thought in the world of 
the Founders.24  More recent writing in intellectual history has moved well 
beyond the libraries of great men and the four corners of individual printed 
texts.  Louis Menand’s celebrated study of pragmatism, The Metaphysical 
Club, ranges widely over major and minor intellectual thinkers and 
canvasses a host of cultural movements in an effort to understand 
 
 20. DAVID D. HALL, WORLDS OF WONDER, DAYS OF JUDGMENT:  POPULAR RELIGIOUS 
BELIEF IN EARLY NEW ENGLAND (1989). 
 21. Compare LEONARD W. LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS:  THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION, RIGHTS, AND HISTORY (1995) (following the traditional approach to 
constitutional history), with 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA (Michael 
Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) (applying the methods of social history and 
intellectual history to legal history and constitutional history). 
 22. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS:  THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1981).  For a more recent discussion of the issue, see Christopher 
Childers, Interpreting Popular Sovereignty:  A Historiographical Essay, 57 CIV. WAR HIST. 
48, 49, 63 (2011). 
 23. For an example of how popular sovereignty and popular constitutionalism can be 
studied by looking at a less traditional type of source, see Elizabeth Dale, Popular 
Sovereignty:  A Case Study from the Antebellum Era, in CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGIES:  
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CONTROLLING THE STATE 81 (Alain Marciano ed., 2011). 
 24. H. TREVOR COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE:  WHIG HISTORY AND THE 
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1965). 
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pragmatism, America’s best known philosophical movement.25  The 
connection between Dewey’s thought and major philosophers such as 
Charles Pierce and William James receives its due, but so does the 
influence of less familiar sources, including the Vermont Hegelians who 
shaped Dewey’s first exposure to philosophy at the University of Vermont.  
Non-philosophical influences also figure prominently in Menand’s account, 
including Dewey’s influential friendship with Jane Addams and his 
exposure to popular political radicalism in Chicago during the Pullman 
Strike.26 
Finally, the last of Kloppenberg’s guiding principles, the extension of the 
range of subjects worthy of historical attention, recognizes the profound 
impact of social history on intellectual historians.  One subfield that has 
blossomed in recent years is the history of the book.  Indeed, the second 
volume of the American Antiquarian Society’s five-volume History of the 
Book in America focuses on the print culture of the Founding era.27  As 
Kloppenberg notes, the history of the book has refined the way that scholars 
approach the “production, distribution, circulation, and reception of 
texts.”28  Appreciating the dynamics of this vibrant sphere of print culture is 
essential for any scholar interested in understanding the original debate over 
the Constitution’s meaning. 
Intellectual biographies remain a popular genre, particularly with the 
general reading public.  In the case of the Founding era, the phenomenon of 
“Founders Chic” shows no sign of disappearing anytime soon.  New 
biographies of leading Founders and forgotten Founders appear with some 
regularity and often grace the New York Times’s Best Sellers list.29  
Although biographies of Thomas Jefferson show no sign of going out of 
fashion, historical attention has broadened its focus to take in the other 
denizens of Monticello.  Annette Gordon Reed’s prize-winning study of the 
African American Hemings family has taken its place alongside the many 
fine studies of Thomas Jefferson.30  Intellectual history is no longer 
exclusively a study of the history of intellectuals and other elites, but rather 
is a study of individuals and groups, men and women—thinking, acting, 
and creating. 
Contemporary intellectual history has not abandoned classic texts such as 
the Declaration of Independence, but the treatment accorded these texts has 
 
 25. LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001). 
 26. Id. at 264–66, 306–12, 353–58. 
 27. 2 DAVID D. HALL ET AL., A HISTORY OF THE BOOK IN AMERICA:  AN EXTENSIVE 
REPUBLIC:  PRINT, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY IN THE NEW NATION, 1790–1840 (2010). 
 28. Kloppenberg, supra note 9, at 206.  For a study of ratification that focuses on the 
production, distribution, and reception of Anti-Federalist pamphlets, broadsides, and 
newspaper essays, see CORNELL, supra note 12. 
 29. H.W. Brands, Founders Chic:  Our Reverence for the Fathers Has Gotten Out of 
Hand, 292 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 101 (Sept. 2003); David Waldstreicher, Founders Chic As 
Culture War, 84 RADICAL HIST. REV. 185 (2002). 
 30. See ANNETTE GORDON-REED, THE HEMINGSES OF MONTICELLO:  AN AMERICAN 
FAMILY (2008). 
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been transformed by new approaches.  Morton White’s classic study, The 
Philosophy of the American Revolution, approached the Declaration with 
the tools of philosophy, focusing considerable attention on John Locke.31  
More recent work on the Declaration has highlighted topics ranging from 
the way Francesco Geminiani’s treatise on violin playing shaped the 
cadences of Jefferson’s writing, to the role that popular political discourses 
played in the origins of the Declaration of Independence.32 
Finally, Kloppenberg reminds us that ideas often cross conventional 
political boundaries.  One can discern an increasingly transnational trend in 
recent intellectual history, a development that Kloppenberg’s own work on 
pragmatism has helped to encourage.33  It is no longer remarkable to 
explore American ideas in a transatlantic context.  In her recent study of 
America’s reception of Nietzsche’s thought, historian Jennifer Ratner-
Rosenhagen crisscrosses the Atlantic and surveys more than a century of 
shifting responses to one of Germany’s most enigmatic but influential 
intellectuals.34  In one sense, Ratner-Rosenhagen’s study parallels Merrill 
Peterson’s classic study of the shifting assessments of Jefferson in 
American culture, The Jefferson Image in the American Mind.35  What 
marks her work as emblematic of the new approach to intellectual history is 
its anti-essentialist approach to texts.  Her study fits historian Daniel 
Rodgers’s notion that intellectual history ought to be framed around 
narratives about “men and women thinking:  making, consuming, and 
remaking ideas and language, arguing and conversing.”36 
The current model of intellectual history, what Kloppenberg calls 
pragmatic hermeneutics, also acknowledges an important debt to the work 
of the Cambridge School’s approach to the history of political thought.  The 
leading theoretician associated with the Cambridge School, Quentin 
Skinner, published a number of influential essays using modern language 
philosophy to ground the contextualist method of intellectual history.  In an 
early essay elaborating his approach to interpreting historical texts, Skinner 
concisely states one of his most important theoretical claims about 
contextualist historical method:  to understand a historical text one must 
first define the range of possible meanings an utterance might have had at a 
given historical moment.37  The first rule of any truly historicist method, he 
asserts, is that:  “[N]o agent can eventually be said to have meant or done 
something which he could never be brought to accept as a correct 
 
 31. See MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1978). 
 32. See JAY FLIEGELMAN, DECLARING INDEPENDENCE:  JEFFERSON, NATURAL LANGUAGE, 
AND THE CULTURE OF PERFORMANCE (1993); PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE:  
MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1997). 
 33. See JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY:  SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND 
PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT 1870–1920 (1986). 
 34. See JENNIFER RATNER-ROSENHAGEN, AMERICAN NIETZSCHE:  A HISTORY OF AN ICON 
AND HIS IDEAS (2012). 
 35. MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE JEFFERSON IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND (1960). 
 36. Daniel T. Rodgers, Thinking in Verbs, 18 INTELL. HIST. NEWSL. 21, 21–22 (1996). 
 37. See generally Quentin Skinner, Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts, 3 
NEW LITERARY HIST. 393 (1972). 
2013] THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY ALTERNATIVE 729 
 
description of what he had meant or done.”38  This rule might be dubbed the 
injunction against anachronism.  In the view of philosopher Richard Rorty, 
this aspect of Skinner’s method is central to any effort to understand the 
meaning of historical texts, including texts in the history of philosophy.39  
The second rule states, “The success of any act of communication 
necessarily depends on . . . a whole complex of conventions, social as well 
as linguistic.”40  Skinner’s point is not that meaning is objective, but rather 
that it is public and hence intersubjective.41  Moreover, the public and 
intersubjective nature of language enjoins historians to recognize that the 
meaning of a text is determined by a range of contextual factors, some 
linguistic and others social.  Cast in these terms, the task of the historian is 
similar to the cultural anthropologist.  Indeed, in his later work, Skinner 
acknowledged the profound influence of anthropologist Clifford Geertz, 
whose theory of “thick description” inspired a generation of intellectual and 
cultural historians.42  In a much-cited essay, Geertz explored how an 
anthropologist might distinguish a wink from a facial tick.43  To understand 
 
 38. Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, in MEANING 
AND CONTEXT:  QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS 29, 48 (James Tully & Quentin Skinner 
eds., 1988); see also 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, VISIONS OF POLITICS:  REGARDING METHOD 
(2002). 
 39. Richard Rorty, The Historiography of Philosophy:  Four Genres in Philosophy in 
History, in PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY 50 (Richard Rorty et al. eds., 1984). 
 40. For an endorsement of this aspect of Skinner’s method, see Thomas L. Haskell, 
Responsibility, Convention, and the Role of Ideas in History, in  IDEAS, IDEOLOGIES, AND 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:  THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE SINCE 1800, at 5 (Peter A. Coclanis 
& Stuart Bruchey eds., 1999).  Among originalists, Solum has been especially critical of 
Skinner.  Solum’s critique of Skinner’s earliest theoretical writings anachronistically argues 
that Skinner’s forays into the philosophy of language were obviously wrong-headed at the 
time they were published. See BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 5, at 57.  It is hard to reconcile 
this claim with the fact that Skinner’s essays were published in the leading peer reviewed 
British philosophy journal in a special issue on the philosophy of language. Quentin Skinner, 
Conventions and the Understanding of Speech Acts, 20 PHIL. Q. 118, 133 (1970).  Skinner’s 
article responded to one of the most influential articles in the modern philosophy of 
language, P.F. Strawson, Intention and Convention in Speech Acts, 73 PHIL. REV. 439 
(1964).  Admittedly, Skinner’s article drew two critical responses, but this does not diminish 
the article’s significance at the time; rather, it suggests that his article was taken very 
seriously by philosophers of language. See Peter Mew, Conventions on Thin Ice, 21 PHIL. Q. 
352 (1971); B.C. O’Neill, Conventions and Illocutionary Force, 22 PHIL. Q. 215 (1972).  
Skinner’s early writings now seem dated, especially given that the ascendant paradigm in the 
philosophy of language seems to favor Strawson and Grice’s intentionalism over Skinner’s 
conventionalism.  For an overview of the debate concerning speech act theory in the 
philosophy of language, see Mitchell Green, Speech Acts, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 
3, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/speech-acts/.  On the danger of 
reading the history of philosophy in an anachronistic manner, see generally PHILOSOPHY IN 
HISTORY, supra note 39. 
 41. For an example of one prominent originalist who argues in favor of the idea of 
objective meaning, see Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011). 
 42. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 9–10 (1973). 
 43. See id.  Skinner notes that during his appointment at the Institute for Advanced 
Study in Princeton, his work took a more Geertzian turn. See Skinner, Reply to My Critics, in 
MEANING AND CONTEXT, supra note 38, at 231, 234 & n.15.  Skinner also credits his 
discussion with other members of the Institute, most notably Thomas Kuhn and Richard 
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the meaning of this gesture, one must embed the action in a “web of 
signification” and recover the actor’s intention, assuming that what had 
been witnessed was a wink and not an involuntary muscle spasm.44 
Skinner’s earliest writings drew heavily on J.L. Austin’s theory of speech 
acts.  According to Skinner, the recovery of meaning required analyzing 
both the locutionary act and its illocutionary force.45  Scholars must not 
only pay attention to what an author said, but must also ask what an author 
was doing by making a particular statement on a given occasion.46  
Skinner’s use of Austin and his conventionalist account of meaning has 
prompted a lively debate among historians, political theorists, and 
philosophers of language.47 
In responding to his critics, Skinner has stressed that his own early views, 
based on Austin’s speech act theory, have evolved in light of insights 
derived from subsequent scholarship by Paul Grice, P.F. Strawson, and 
John Searle.48  Unfortunately, Skinner has never fleshed out what a full-
scale revision of his method would look like at a theoretical level.  Instead, 
he has focused most of his scholarly energy on substantive historical 
questions in the history of political thought.49  The task of envisioning what 
such a Gricean revision of intellectual history would look like has been 
made somewhat easier to imagine because of the efforts of philosophers of 
language working on issues of historical method and legal interpretation.50 
One of Skinner’s more sophisticated theoretical critics, the philosopher 
of language A.P. Martinich, has framed such a neo-Gricean model of 
intellectual history.  Martinich notes that intellectual historians must begin 
with the semantic content of texts, but he also emphasizes that historians 
must move beyond semantics, to discern commutative intent, which is what 
a speaker meant by using a particular sentence on a given occasion.51  
 
Rorty. Id.  Among the tangible outcomes from that period was the important volume, 
PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY, supra note 39; see also GEERTZ, supra note 42. 
 44. GEERTZ, supra note 42, at 9.  Skinner’s emphasis on Grice’s notion of non-natural 
meaning is very close to his gloss on Geertzian thick description. See generally GEERTZ, 
supra note 42; PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989); MEANING AND 
CONTEXT, supra note 38.  Recent intellectual history probably owes a much greater debt to 
Geertzian thick description than it does to modern philosophy of language.  On historians’ 
debt to Geertz, see William H. Sewell Jr., Geertz, Cultural Systems, and History:  From 
Synchrony to Transformation, 59 REPRESENTATIONS 35, 35 (1997). 
 45. Skinner, supra note 38, at 61. 
 46. See generally id. 
 47. See generally MEANING AND CONTEXT, supra note 38.  Mark Bevir casts his critique 
of Skinner in the antifoundationalist terms of postanalytical philosophy. MARK BEVIR, THE 
LOGIC OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1999); Mark Bevir, Anglophone Historicism:  From 
Modernist Method to Post-analytic Philosophy, 3 J. PHIL. HIST. 211 (2009). 
 48. Quentin Skinner, “Social Meaning” and the Explanation of Social Action, in 
MEANING AND CONTEXT, supra note 38, at 79, 89. 
 49. For two recent works representative of Skinner’s historical work on early modern 
political thought, see QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM (1998), and QUENTIN 
SKINNER, REASON AND RHETORIC IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES (2009). 
 50. See infra notes 51–61 and accompanying text. 
 51. Martinich, supra note 8, at 610–11. 
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Philosophers of language working on legal interpretation have made much 
the same point.52 
Martinich’s application of Gricean insights to the practice of intellectual 
history is an important step forward in the evolving effort to clarify the 
practice of intellectual history.53  The essays gathered in Philosophical 
Foundations of Language in the Law provide additional insights on how 
pragmatics can clarify the search for constitutional meaning.54  Although 
they do not offer a detailed critique of contemporary originalist theory, they 
do analyze the textualist methods of statutory construction employed by 
Justice Scalia, a methodology which closely parallels aspects of new 
originalist methodology.  Scott Soames and Andrei Marmor note that 
Justice Scalia’s textualism conflates and confuses two distinct conceptions 
of meaning elaborated in recent scholarship in the philosophy of language:  
the semantic content, which is the linguistic meaning of a text, and the 
assertive content, which is what a text stipulates or asserts.  Soames and 
Marmor make a powerful argument that it is asserted content, not semantic 
content, that ought to define the legal meaning of a text.55 
In many situations, determining assertive or communicative intent 
requires moving beyond the actual words on the page to consider the 
pragmatic features of communication.  In other words, determining 
semantic meaning is not the end of the inquiry, it is merely the start.  If one 
follows Grice’s program, particularly the way it has been developed in 
contemporary philosophy of language, one must move beyond semantics to 
pragmatics.  As Marmor notes regarding semantic theories of constitutional 
meaning:  “[T]he semantic considerations employed in this debate are 
inconclusive; the way concepts are used in a given context depends on 
various pragmatic determinants, and those, in turn, depend on the nature of 
the conversation in question.”56 
Elaborating the differences between ordinary communication and legal 
communication is a first step in analyzing the pragmatics of legal 
communication.57  Marmor’s work in this area is especially useful in 
 
 52. For an interesting critique of Skinner’s methodology in expressly Gricean terms, see 
Martinich, supra note 8, and A.P. Martinich, Four Senses of “Meaning” in the History of 
Ideas:  Quentin Skinner’s Theory of Historical Interpretation, 3 J. PHIL. HIST. 225 (2009).  
For another critique of the methods of the Cambridge School from the perspective of English 
constitutional history, see D. Alan Orr, A Prospectus for a “New” Constitutional History of 
Early Modern England, 36 ALBION 430, 448 (2004). 
 53. Martinich, supra note 8, at 610–11. 
 54. See generally PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW, supra note 8. 
 55. Introduction, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW, supra note 
8, at 8;  Marmor, supra note 8, at 423; Soames, supra note 11, at 42. 
 56. See Andrei Marmor, Meaning and Belief in Constitutional Interpretation, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 577 (2013). 
 57. For a discussion of the problems of applying ordinary conversational models to legal 
texts, see generally Mark Greenberg, Legislation As Communication?  Legal Interpretation 
and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE 
IN THE LAW, supra note 8, and Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945 
(1990).  Soames concedes that collectively authored texts complicate the process of 
discerning intent, but he does not believe that this poses an insurmountable problem. See 
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thinking about the practice of constitutional history.  Legal texts are not 
typically produced according to the cooperative rules of communication 
that govern ordinary language situations, but are generally modeled on 
strategic, not cooperative, principles.  In many cases, Marmor observes, 
legal texts are often products of  “tacitly acknowledged incomplete 
decisions.”58  Another distinguishing feature of legal communication is that 
it is not always clear who the relevant parties to a legal conversation are, 
particularly when the text in question is a constitutional document.  The 
relevant parties might be framers, ratifiers, judges, or some other body of 
actors, depending on the background assumptions of the participants in the 
“conversation.”59 
Grice’s method has a number of important consequences for 
understanding the historical meaning of the Constitution and other 
Founding-era legal texts.60  Most originalists have assumed that 
constitutional communication involves a process of fixation that is largely 
anchored by the semantic content of the Constitution’s text.61  Marmor’s 
neo-Gricean framework suggests that meaning may not be fixed by the 
semantic content of the Constitution’s text.  To achieve consensus at the 
moment a text is enacted, the parties involved might agree on a common 
language but not on a common meaning.  By compromising on language 
that underdetermines constitutional meaning, legal actors can leave the 
resolution of what a text means to subsequent actors to sort out through 
politics or judicial determination.  If Marmor is correct, there may well be 
no original constitutional meaning to discover for many of the more open-
ended provisions of the Constitution.  Instead of establishing a fixed 
original meaning, the text of the Constitution may do no more than set some 
minimal constraints on a range of possible constitutional meanings to be 
determined by pragmatic features of the original constitutional 
conversation.  If this is true, then the fixation thesis, central to so much of 
originalism, may rest on a philosophical error.  The process of fixation of 
constitutional meaning would not be semantically encoded at a Founding 
moment, but would be resolved by pragmatic processes.  Indeed, the 
 
Scott Soames, Toward a Theory of Legal Interpretation, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 231, 232 
(2011).  The problem of collective intent has attracted considerable interest among 
philosophers. See Abraham Sesshu Roth, Shared Agency, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Dec. 
13, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/shared-agency/; Deborah 
Tollefsen, Collective Intentionality, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/
coll-int/ (last updated Aug. 4, 2004). 
 58. Andrei Marmor, Can the Law Imply More Than It Says?  On Some Pragmatic 
Aspects of Strategic Speech, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW, 
supra note 8, at 83, 97. 
 59. Id. at 96–97. 
 60. Grice’s conversational model assumed that communication was cooperative. See 
GRICE, supra note 44; Stephen Neale, Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language, 15 
LINGUISTICS AND PHIL. 509 (1992). 
 61. See BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 5, at 12; Lawrence B. Solum, What Is 
Originalism?  The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF 
ORIGINALISM:  THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12, 33 (Grant Huscroft & 
Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
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resolution of these issues may be even more complex.  There may have 
been conflicts over which sets of assumptions and interpretive rules were 
part of the background knowledge available to the actors.  Indeed, there 
may well have been disagreements over who the relevant parties to the 
original constitutional conversation were:  Framers, ratifiers, judges, or 
some other segment of the population of America in 1788.  All of these 
issues are empirical questions that require historical investigation to answer. 
B.  Originalism and the Flight from Historical Reality 
According to Lawrence Solum, “original public meaning originalists 
believe that the original meaning of the Constitution is a function of the 
original public meaning—or ‘conventional semantic meaning’—of a given 
constitutional provision at the time the provision was framed and 
ratified.”62  Semantic meaning, in his view, is largely a function of the 
“linguistic facts” at the time the Constitution was written and adopted.63  
Moreover, “[n]ew Originalists (or original public meaning originalists) 
believe that patterns of usage by the public at the time of adoption fixed the 
meaning of the Constitution.”64  Another advocate for a semantic version of 
originalism, Randy Barnett, adopts much the same stance:  “What defines 
originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation is the belief that . . . 
the semantic meaning of the written Constitution was fixed at the time of its 
enactment.”65 
Semantic originalist theories reject the search for intent that characterized 
earlier versions of originalism.  Intentionalists sought something akin to 
Gricean speaker meaning, the communicative intent, or what a speaker 
intended to communicate on a given occasion.66  Gricean theory uses 
ordinary face-to-face conversation as its model, a situation where speakers 
conform to a set of conversational maxims aimed at promoting mutual 
understanding.  Supporters of semantic originalism acknowledge that 
constitutional communication does not fit the model of a simple 
conversation.  Building on this insight, they accept the earlier critique of 
originalism that the collective authorship of the Constitution confounds any 
attempt to identify speakers’ intent.  Abandoning speakers’ meaning, 
semantic originalists turn to another Gricean concept:  sentence meaning.  
Solum describes this concept as follows:  the “sentence meaning (or 
‘expression meaning’) of an utterance is the conventional semantic meaning 
 
 62. Solum, Heller and Originalism, supra note 2, at 946. 
 63. Id. at 944. 
 64. Id. at 947. 
 65. Barnett, supra note 41, at 66. 
 66. For a discussion of Gricean speaker meaning and its relevance to intentionalist 
theories of originalism, see Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 540–41 (2013).  Alexander argues that when multiple authors of a 
collectively authored text have different understandings of what they intended to 
communicate, the resulting text would have no meaning at all. Id. at 542.  It would be more 
accurate to describe such a text as having a range of possible meanings.  Fixing the meaning 
of such a text would generally be accomplished by pragmatic processes. 
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of the words and phrases that constitute the utterance.”67  This approach 
purports to avoid the problem of discerning intent by focusing on 
commonly shared public meanings.  Accordingly, semantic originalists 
accord considerable weight to historical dictionaries as a source for 
recovering these linguistic meanings.  The problem with such an approach 
is it rests on a misreading of Grice and a misunderstanding of the history of 
dictionaries.  Grice’s entire philosophical project was to link sentence 
meaning to his intentional understanding of speaker meaning.68  In other 
words, to build a theory of historical meaning from Grice’s idea of sentence 
meaning requires establishing what speakers in the Founding era typically 
intended when they uttered specific sentences.69  Sampling dictionaries, a 
favorite tactic of semantic originalists, will not suffice.70  Even if one 
expanded the range of sources consulted and examined other usages, this 
would not be adequate to illuminate sentence meaning.  To analyze Gricean 
sentence meaning historically one would need to look at how patterns of 
usage correlated with patterns of intentionality at a given historical 
moment.  In other words, new originalists would need to engage in 
precisely the forms of historical inquiry the theory was designed to obviate:  
reconstructing, weighting, and summing the multiple and potentially 
conflicting intents of Framers, ratifiers, and other relevant populations.  
Rather than mark a step forward, semantic originalism leaves us essentially 
at the same impasse traditional originalism faced over the problem of 
 
 67. Solum, Heller and Originalism, supra note 2, at 949. 
 68. For two general discussions of Grice and his project linking an intentionalist theory 
of speaker meaning with sentence meaning, see WILLIAM G. LYCAN, PHILOSOPHY OF 
LANGUAGE:  A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 86–97 (2000), and MICHAEL MORRIS, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 248–70 (2007). 
 69. Stephen Neale notes that “sentence meaning (more broadly, utterance-type meaning) 
can be analyzed (roughly) in terms of regularities over the intentions with which utterers 
produce those sentences on given occasions.” Neale, supra note 60, at 6.  Solum has refined 
his notion of context and now accords greater significance to forms of pragmatic enrichment 
in the current version of his theory:  “‘Public Meaning Originalism’ names the version of 
originalist theory holding that the communicative content of the constitutional text is fixed at 
the time of origin by the conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases in the 
context that was shared by the drafters, ratifiers, and citizens.” See Lawrence B. Solum, 
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 459 (2013).  The 
role of pragmatic enrichment in Solum’s theory remains under-theorized.  Finally, the 
current form of the theory does not acknowledge the need to link usage with intent.  When 
one acknowledges this flaw in semantic originalism, the theory becomes just another variant 
of intentionalism.  For a critique of the new originalism along these lines, see Larry 
Alexander, Constitutional Theories:  A Taxonomy and (Implicit) Critique 23 (San Diego 
Legal Studies, Paper No. 13-120, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2277790 (arguing that new originalist theory is actually parasitic in 
relation to intentionalist theories of meaning). 
 70. See generally, e.g., Barnett, supra note 2.  Barnett has expanded his research agenda 
beyond dictionaries to include a wider range of sources, but his approach is still essentially 
ahistorical.  For the latest statement of Barnett’s methodology, see Barnett, supra note 1; 
supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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intentionality—it lacks a genuine empirical historical methodology to deal 
with multiple and potentially conflicting intents.71 
A number of prominent new originalists have adopted a less 
philosophically self-conscious approach, and advocated the use of a variety 
of different types of fictive readers as a means of reconstructing original 
meaning:  a representative Founding-era lawyer, a competent speaker of 
American English, the typical rational man on the street.  These fictive 
personas are then used as the basis for reconstructing what the Constitution 
meant in 1788.72  Gary Lawson favors a hypothetical reasonable person 
trained in the law.73  Michael Stokes Paulsen posits a reasonable reader as 
the ideal construct.74  Scholars invoking such imaginary readers do not 
seem to be familiar with the rich scholarly literature on reader-response 
literary criticism, the history of publishing and reading, or recent historical 
writing on the social and cultural history of the Founding era.  The use of 
fictive readers in literary criticism was all the rage about thirty years ago, 
but the practice fell out of favor among many literary scholars when 
problems with this methodology became evident.  Once literary critics 
began investigating actual readers and comparing their responses to the 
ideal readers posited by theorists, it soon became apparent that many of 
their critical assumptions about reading practices were simply false.  
Equally troubling was the discovery that many critics unconsciously poured 
their own ideological prejudices into the ideal readers they constructed.75  
While work on the history of publishing and reading has evolved over the 
last two decades, recovering the actual reading practices of long dead 
readers is still among the most elusive historical goals.76  None of the 
originalist advocates for using fictive readers appears to be aware of these 
methodological problems or the scholarly controversies occasioned by 
them.  Indeed, Lawson argues that the advantage of using fictive readers 
over the actual historical readers is that this approach avoids the political 
biases that may have distorted the views of individuals who actually read 
 
 71. This critique of originalism is most closely associated with Paul Brest, supra note 
12. 
 72. On the history of reader-response criticism, see generally Philip Goldstein, Reader-
Response Theory and Criticism, in THE JOHNS HOPKINS GUIDE TO LITERARY THEORY AND 
CRITICISM 793 (Michael Groden et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).  For an effort to use Gricean theory 
in literary criticism, see generally MARY LOUISE PRATT, TOWARD A SPEECH ACT THEORY OF 
LITERARY DISCOURSE (1977). 
 73. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism As a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 47, 79 (2006). 
 74. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1144–45 (2003). 
 75. See generally JANICE A. RADWAY, READING THE ROMANCE:  WOMEN, PATRIARCHY, 
AND POPULAR LITERATURE (1984). 
 76. See generally Martyn P. Thompson, Reception Theory and the Interpretation of 
Historical Meaning, 32 HIST. & THEORY 248 (1993).  On the empirical problems of using 
reader theory on historical texts, see Ian Jackson, Approaches to the History of Readers and 
Reading in Eighteenth-Century Britain, 47 HIST. J. 1041 (2004), and Eric Slauter, Reading 
and Radicalization:  Print, Politics, and the American Revolution, 8 EARLY AM. STUD. 
5 (2010). 
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the Constitution and interpreted it two hundred years ago.77  Apparently, 
Lawson believes that the historical actors who wrote, ratified, and later 
interpreted the Constitution were somehow compromised by their political 
biases, but a modern law professor is able to rise above any similar 
ideological blindness or bias.78 
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport dub their approach “original 
methods originalism.”79  This theory argues that “to find what an informed 
speaker of the language would have understood the Constitution’s meaning 
to be, one must look to the interpretive rules that were customarily applied 
to such a document.”80  The two scholars define an informed speaker as “a 
competent and reasonable speaker at the time of the Constitution’s 
enactment.”81  Exactly what criteria define such a person is a bit of a 
mystery.  The theory does not articulate any clear rules for constructing 
such a person.  Nor does the theory make clear what body of historical 
sources would define this imaginary person’s worldview.82  The basic 
assumption undergirding this theory is that there was a broad consensus on 
interpretive methods in the Founding era.  In reality, the Founding era was 
characterized by serious divisions and conflict, including a deep rift 
separating Federalists from Anti-Federalists and an even larger divide 
between popular and elite approaches to constitutional texts.83 
McGinnis and Rappaport insist that the Constitution must be read as a 
legal document, but they treat Founding-era legal culture in an 
anachronistic manner and assume the existence of a consensus on issues 
that were actually deeply contested in 1788.  Consider their ungrounded 
assertion that ordinary Americans would have simply deferred to lawyers 
when interpreting the Constitution.  To justify this approach, McGinnis and 
Rappaport make the following unsubstantiated claim: 
It is a common, if not universal, reaction for a layperson to read a legal 
document—whether a contract, a statute, or a constitution—and have the 
following reaction:  “Well, it seems to mean X to me, but I am not a 
lawyer.  To be sure of its meaning, we will need a lawyer to read it.”84 
The assertion that a deferential attitude toward lawyers represents some 
type of universal transhistorical truth about the way Americans have 
 
 77. Lawson, supra note 2, at 341 n.51. 
 78. One need not subscribe to radical skepticism or nihilism to recognize that there is no 
objective scholarly stance from which to understand the past.  Historians are just as 
historically situated as the historical actors they study.  This does not mean that efforts to 
understand the past are impossible or that all accounts of the past are equally plausible or 
hold the same analytical power.  For a refutation of such a simplistic claim, see Richard 
Rorty et al., Introduction, in PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY, supra note 39, at 1, 8. 
 79. See generally McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles, supra note 
2; McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 2. 
 80. McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 2, at 752. 
 81. Id. at 761. 
 82. See examples infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 83. See infra notes 92–93. 
 84. It is odd that such a sweeping claim would be unsubstantiated by any scholarly 
support. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 2, at 765. 
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approached legal documents, including texts as different as contracts, 
statutes, and constitutions, is hard to reconcile with existing scholarship 
about contemporary attitudes toward the law in America.85  In particular, it 
blurs the vital distinction between the way Americans approach 
constitutional texts and other legal texts such as contracts.  While some 
Americans might defer to lawyers when reading a contract, there is no 
compelling evidence that they show the same deference when looking at the 
meaning of the Constitution.  Many Americans have very clear views about 
what they think the Constitution means, and on the issues that matter to 
them, such as the right to bear arms, the idea that they would defer to 
lawyers who opposed their views seems wildly out of touch with reality and 
is contradicted by a mountain of evidence.86 
The deference hypothesis makes even less sense in the context of the 
Founding era. Ratification was not marked by polite deference, but by vocal 
contestation.  Anti-Federalist Amos Singletary’s impassioned speech at the 
Massachusetts Ratification Convention is perhaps the best known and most 
often repeated example of the profound antilawyer sentiment articulated 
during ratification.87  Clearly, McGinnis and Rappaport have not spent 
enough time with Founding-era sources, or they would have encountered 
other texts articulating similar attitudes: 
These lawyers, and men of learning, and monied men, that talk so finely 
and gloss over matters so smoothly, to make us poor illiterate people 
swallow down the pill, expect to get into Congress themselves; they 
expect to be the managers of this Constitution and get all the power and 
all the money into their own hands, and then they will swallow up all us 
little folks, like the great Leviathan, Mr. President, yes, just as the whale 
swallowed up Jonah.88 
 
 85. For a very different view of popular attitudes toward lawyers in modern America, 
see MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR:  LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE (2005).  In 
a November 2012 survey of how Americans view various professions in terms of honesty 
and ethics, lawyers ranked near the bottom of the list. Honesty/Ethics in Professions, 
GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1654/honesty-ethics-professions.aspx (last visited Oct. 
21, 2013).  Interestingly, Congress scored even lower.  Only 10 percent of Americans 
surveyed believed members of Congress were honest and ethical. Id.  Among the professions 
listed, only car salespersons were seen as less honest and ethical. Id. 
 86. Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2042 (2012) 
(reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011), and DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE 
LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010)) (noting, correctly, that most gun owners would not change 
their view of the Second Amendment if scholarly evidence contrary to their view was 
presented to them).  Indeed, most gun owners and gun rights advocates never accepted the 
orthodox collective rights view of the Amendment that most courts and legal experts adopted 
in the seventy years leading up to Heller. See Siegel, supra note 6, at 211–12. 
 87. Convention Debates, 25 January, A.M., in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1344–48 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
2000). 
 88. Id. at 1346–47.  Illiteracy in this context connotes the absence of formal learning, 
particularly knowledge of Latin, and not an inability to read or write.  For a discussion of 
Singletary’s speech in this context, see MICHAEL WARNER, THE LETTERS OF THE REPUBLIC:  
PUBLICATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1992). 
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McGinnis and Rappaport do not cite any of the rich scholarly literature 
on the history of publishing and reading that has transformed the way 
historians and literary scholars approach Founding-era texts.  Rather than 
grounding their approach in this scholarly literature, they engage in a 
typical originalist dodge, citing another originalist scholar with no expertise 
to support propositions that are well beyond the scholarly expertise of the 
person being cited.  In the case of the publishing history of ratification, 
McGinnis and Rappaport cite the work of originalist scholar John Yoo.  
Setting aside the controversial nature of Yoo’s work on executive authority 
and foreign affairs, the decision to treat him as an authority on Founding-
era political, social, or cultural history is hard to fathom.  Based on Yoo’s 
pedestrian observation that pamphlets were used to help spread ideas during 
ratification, McGinnis and Rappaport jump to the following wildly 
inaccurate conclusion: 
[T]he people decided whether to ratify the Constitution based on an 
explanation of its meaning by those with legal knowledge.  Pamphleteers 
of all kinds wrote lengthy explications of the Constitution precisely so 
that the people could be informed.  It is not too much to say that they 
translated the condensed, sometimes technical language of the legal 
document into familiar language more easily accessible to the electorate 
as a whole.89 
At the time the Constitution was framed, most lawyers were trained by an 
apprenticeship system.  In contrast to modern law, there was no system of 
accredited schools, no standard textbooks, and no uniform examination 
system to determine who passed the bar.  In the Founding era, none of these 
attributes of a modern profession existed.  James Wilson was one of the 
most eminent lawyers in the new nation.  Although respected by many, 
Wilson was not well regarded by all Pennsylvanians.  Anyone familiar with 
ratification in Pennsylvania would know that Wilson was mocked, 
denounced, and burned in effigy because of his status as a member of the 
state’s legal elite.90  He stood at one extreme of this legal spectrum.  At the 
other extreme were ordinary citizens who gained most of their knowledge 
 
 89. McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 2, at 771 (citing 
John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1375 (1997)).  
Yoo bases his assessment on a “glance” at the Documentary History of the Ratification of the 
Constitution and does not cite any relevant historical scholarship on the complex history of 
ratification.  On the controversy around Yoo’s abuse of historical sources, see Janet Cooper 
Alexander, John Yoo’s War Powers:  The Law Review and the World, 100 CALIF. L. REV 
331 (2012).  Other scholars have also challenged Yoo’s approach to history. See Martin S. 
Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 
(1995); Martin S. Flaherty, The Practice of Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1565 (1997); see 
also Julian Davis Mortenson, Executive Power and the Discipline of History, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 377 (2011). 
 90. On attitudes toward Wilson in Pennsylvania, see PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION:  
THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 121 (2010), and Saul Cornell, The 
People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution:  Popular Constitutionalism and the 
Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 324 (2011). 
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from the popular press.91  In the middle of this vast spectrum were the 
majority of practicing lawyers who had served in an apprenticeship and 
may have owned a modest law library of a small number of essential texts 
such as Blackstone.  On almost any constitutional question of any 
significance debated during ratification, there was likely to be a range of 
possible views.92 
As a generation of scholarship in the history of the book has shown, 
American readers seldom acted like empty vessels into which elites might 
pour their own ideological wine.  Reading the Constitution was no 
exception to this general pattern.  Singletary’s charges at the Massachusetts 
Ratification Convention that Federalists wished to cram the Constitution 
down the people’s throats were hardly unique; Anti-Federalists made 
similar claims in many states.  Anti-Federalists rejected Federalist pleas for 
deference and were not passive consumers of constitutional texts.  The 
surviving evidence clearly demonstrates that Americans actively sought out 
a range of different texts to read and drew their own conclusions about what 
the words of the Constitution meant.  Thus, an essential first step to 
reconstructing constitutional meaning in this era requires analyzing the 
process of literary production, the circulation of published materials, and, 
most crucially and where possible, the reader responses of individuals and 
particular groups within both the Federalist and Anti-Federalist movements.  
Only once we have fully analyzed these processes can scholars begin to 
understand the pragmatics of constitutional communication in the Founding 
era. 
The circulation of Mercy Otis Warren’s Columbian Patriot Essays is a 
good illustration of the complexity of these processes.  The New York City 
Anti-Federal Committee forwarded 1,700 copies of the essay to various 
Anti-Federal committees throughout the state.  The Albany Anti-Federal 
Committee expressed its gratitude for this gesture, but remarked that the 
pamphlet was “a well composed piece, . . . [but] in a stile too sublime and 
florid for us common people in this Part of the Country.”93  Clearly, the 
preferences of leading Anti-Federalists in New York City did not mirror 
those in other parts of the state.  Backcountry Pennsylvania provides 
another example of the same dynamic.  William Petrikin, an Anti-Federalist 
from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, also made clear his ideological preferences 
about what sort of pamphlets and newspaper essays would be most 
welcome among common folk in western Pennsylvania.  He requested that 
copies of Centinel, one of the most radical democratic voices within the 
ranks of the Anti-Federalist opposition, be forwarded to him for 
distribution.  Centinel’s popularity and influence among ordinary readers in 
the Pennsylvania backcountry was considerable.  Rather than follow the 
 
 91. See Cornell, supra note 90, at 329–30. 
 92. See Alfred S. Konefsky, The Legal Profession:  From the Revolution to the Civil 
War, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 21, at 68. 
 93. On the differences between popular and elite reactions to various Anti-Federalist 
pamphlets, see CORNELL, supra note 12, at 36. 
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simplistic top-down model in which constitutional meaning trickles down 
from elites—the view implicit in virtually all originalist scholarship—it 
would make far more sense to heed Kloppenberg’s advice and study the 
production, distribution, and reception of constitutional texts in the 
Founding era.  Only after one has mapped the interpretive landscape of the 
Founding era and arrived at a plausible account of how to weight the 
different texts surviving from this period, can one begin to explore the 
pragmatics of constitutional meaning in 1788 or 1791. 
II.  ORIGINALISM AS CONSTITUTIONAL SCAM:  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER 
District of Columbia v. Heller94 has been praised by originalists as the 
best example of the interpretive power of their methodology.  Criticism of 
the decision has been equally scathing and has been leveled from across the 
contemporary ideological spectrum.  Ironically, some of the most intense 
attacks have come from conservatives who have accused Justice Scalia of 
abandoning judicial restraint for activism, applying his own methodology in 
a selective fashion, constructing an incoherent theory of the Constitution, 
and conjuring up a fantasy version of America’s constitutional past.95 
Leading advocates of new originalism are among the most conspicuous 
defenders of Justice Scalia’s methodology in Heller.  Lawrence Solum 
praises the decision, observing that “Heller is certainly the clearest and 
most prominent example of originalism in contemporary Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.”96  Randy Barnett extols Justice Scalia’s “textual analysis” 
as “state of the art.”97  Barnett may well be right about the artfulness of 
Scalia’s opinion, but the art in Heller is more akin to a surrealist painting 
than a faithful effort at rendering the past.  Rather than reconstruct the 
historical reality and meaning of the Second Amendment as Americans in 
1791 understood it, Justice Scalia constructs a Salvador Dali–like historical 
landscape of melted clocks, eerie landscapes, and grotesque caricatures. 
Lawrence Solum applauds Justice Scalia’s emphasis on semantic 
meaning and commends his methodology, particularly his decision to use 
historical dictionaries to ferret out the meaning of the Second Amendment.  
The most obvious problem with using historical dictionaries to sort out the 
meaning of key terms in the Second Amendment is that contemporary 
dictionaries did not define the term “bear arms.”  This fact did not deter 
Justice Scalia, who simply chose to treat the words  “bear” and “arms” 
separately, concluding that the former simply meant carry and the latter 
 
 94. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 95. For criticism on the right, see Richard A. Epstein, A Structural Interpretation of the 
Second Amendment:  Why Heller Is (Probably) Wrong on Originalist Grounds, 59 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 171 (2008), Charles Fried, The Second Annual Kennedy Lecture:  On 
Judgment, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1031 (2011), and Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 264–75.  
For an equally devastating critique from a liberal perspective, see Siegel, supra note 6. 
 96. Solum, Heller and Originalism, supra note 2, at 980. 
 97. For Barnett’s view of the case, see Barnett, supra note 1, at 423. 
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referred to guns.  Through this sleight of hand, he effectively rewrote the 
Second Amendment so that it read:  the right of the people to keep and 
carry guns shall not be infringed.98 
Given that there were a small number of English dictionaries to consult 
from this era, one might have expected Justice Scalia to look at them all 
with some care.  One text he obviously did not consult was Nathan Bailey’s 
Universal Etymological English Dictionary, which actually uses the phrase 
“bear arms.”99  Bailey discusses this term in the context of defining another 
key concept from the period, “political arthmetick,” the forerunner of 
modern social science, the “application of arithmetical calculations to 
political uses.”100  After summarizing one author’s statistical observations 
about birth rates and mortality rates, Bailey notes that another important 
ratio of interest for students of political economy was “the proportion of 
men able to bear arms, which he reckons from 18 to 56 years old, and 
accounts about a quarter of the whole.”101  Bailey clearly understood the 
term “bear arms” to define a portion of the population able to participate in 
military activity. 
Yet, even if Justice Scalia had not cherry-picked his evidence from early 
dictionaries, and had consulted the full range of extant sources, there are 
still serious limits to using these types of texts to research the historical 
meaning of words.  Early dictionaries were not assembled according to the 
 
 98. See generally Heller, 554 U.S. at 576.  American dictionaries postdate the Second 
Amendment, a fact that Scalia ignores.  Thus, Scalia cites the American Dictionary of the 
English Language from 1828, but shows no awareness that the forty year gap separating the 
drafting of the Second Amendment and the publication of Webster’s dictionary was a period 
of profound change in American culture.  Indeed, the radical transformation in American life 
in this period is central to one of America’s most important literary tales from this era, Rip 
Van Winkle.  On Justice Scalia’s Rip Van Winkle problem, see Saul Cornell, Heller, New 
Originalism, and Law Office History:  “Meet the New Boss, Same As the Old Boss,” 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2009).   Historian Gordon Wood uses Washington Irving’s story of Rip 
Van Winkle’s slumber and rude awakening as the narrative anchor to open his prize-winning 
contribution to the Oxford History of the United States. See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF 
LIBERTY:  A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815 (2009). 
 99. NATHAN BAILEY, THE UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY 606 
(London, Thomas Cox 1731).  Rickie Sonpal notes that Justice Thomas used three 
Founding-era English dictionaries in his Lopez opinion:  Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary of 
the English Language (1773), Nathan Bailey’s An Universal Etymological English 
Dictionary (1789), and Thomas Sheridan’s A Complete Dictionary of the English Language 
(1796). Rickie Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2177 (2003).  It is curious that only two of these three were consulted in Heller.  Bailey, the 
only one to actually use the term “bear arms,” was curiously omitted.  Scalia’s manipulation 
of evidence is further compounded by the fact that Bailey was clearly popular in America.  
Advertisements for Bailey’s dictionary in American newspapers underscores this fact. See 
PENN. PACKET, September 21, 1784, at 3. 
 100. On the history of political arithmetic and its relationship to modern statistics and 
social science, see TED MCCORMICK, WILLIAM PETTY AND THE AMBITIONS OF POLITICAL 
ARITHMETIC (2010). 
 101. BAILEY, supra note 99, at 606.  None of the dictionaries cited by Justice Scalia 
include an entry for “bear arms.” SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (Edinburgh, Tho. Brown, R. Ross & J. Symington, 11th ed. 1797); TIMOTHY 
CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (Dublin, Sar. Cotter, Hen. Saunders 
& Jam. Williams, 1764). 
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rigorous scholarly procedures developed by modern lexicographers. 
Historical dictionaries were far from complete, were generally assembled in 
an idiosyncratic manner, and were often prescriptive, not descriptive in 
nature.  Indeed, as the example of Bailey suggests, Justice Scalia did not 
even bother to fully survey all the dictionaries from the period.102  Rather 
than document and analyze the actual usage of “bear arms” in a systematic 
fashion, Justice Scalia simply plucks a few isolated examples to further his 
ideological agenda.103 
Heller’s manipulations and misrepresentations of the past are not simply 
a function of a failure to sample enough sources.  Scalia’s opinion does not 
lack evidence, but the sources are selected for ideological reasons, not 
according to any neutral scholarly criteria.  All surviving texts are of equal 
weight because they can be invoked as evidence of original public meaning.  
Once one severs meaning from communicative intent, words can be read in 
almost any way that serves the ideological agenda of contemporary judges 
and lawyers.  This approach leads to absurd conclusions in Heller.  One of 
the most egregious examples of this process of ideological manipulation 
occurs in Heller’s treatment of Quaker opposition to bearing arms.  In 
essence, Justice Scalia substitutes his own twisted interpretation of Quaker 
belief for the actual historical ideas and practices of eighteenth-century 
Friends.104 
Quakers in several states, including Pennsylvania, sought exemptions 
from mandatory service in the militia because they were religiously 
scrupulous about bearing arms.  Indeed, Madison’s original draft of the 
Second Amendment included a provision that would have exempted those 
scrupulous about bearing arms from militia service.  This language was 
dropped when Elbridge Gerry raised the alarm that a potentially tyrannical 
government might use this power to decide who was scrupulous about 
bearing arms and disarm them, effectively undermining the state militias.  
There was no discussion of private uses of arms in this Congressional 
debate, but Justice Scalia simply discounts this fact because he treats the 
entire episode as a type of legislative history and hence irrelevant to 
 
 102. See Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a 
Fortress:  The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 
242–62 (1999). See generally ANTHONY PAUL COWIE, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF 
LEXICOGRAPHY (2009).  America’s first dictionaries postdate the Constitution. See RICHARD 
ROLLINS, THE LONG JOURNEY OF NOAH WEBSTER 123 (1980).  The modern Oxford English 
Dictionary, by contrast, does include a listing for “bear arms” and offers this definition:  “to 
serve as a soldier, do military service, fight.” 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Edmund 
S. Weiner & John Simpson eds., 1989). 
 103. Nathan Kozuskanich, Originalism, History, and the Second Amendment:  What Did 
Bearing Arms Really Mean to the Founders?, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 413 (2008); Nathan 
Kozuskanich, Originalism in a Digital Age:  An Inquiry into the Right To Bear Arms, 29 J. 
EARLY REPUBLIC 585, 585–606 (2009) (documenting that the vast majority of the uses of the 
term “bear arms” support the modern Oxford English Dictionary’s historical definition and 
contradict Justice Scalia’s claims in Heller). 
 104. On the complex history of the Quaker Peace Testimony, see generally MEREDITH 
BALDWIN WEDDLE, WALKING IN THE WAY OF PEACE:  QUAKER PACIFISM IN THE 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (2001). 
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establishing original public meaning.105  Even if one accepted Justice 
Scalia’s somewhat incoherent objections to the use of legislative history 
and his philosophically flawed claim that one can understand meaning 
without establishing communicative intent, his tendentious reading of 
Quaker belief is an example of ipse dixit bordering on the hallucinatory.106 
Justice Scalia provides his own novel interpretation of Quaker pacifism.  
According to him, Quaker teaching prohibited going to war and “personal 
gunfights.”107  “Quakers opposed the use of arms not just for militia 
service, but for any violent purpose whatsoever.”108  It is not exactly clear 
what Justice Scalia is alluding to when he talks about Quaker opposition to 
“personal gunfights.”  This term conjures up an image more appropriate for 
the classic Hollywood westerns of Justice Scalia’s youth than it does to the 
realities of the eighteenth century.109  Quakers opposed dueling, as did 
many others in eighteenth-century America, and the practice was illegal in 
many places.  Rates of interpersonal violence among Quakers living in 
Pennsylvania were among the lowest in America.110  Justice Scalia seems to 
suggest that because Quakers opposed all forms of violence, their appeals to 
be exempt from legal arms-bearing requirements were simply an extension 
of a more general opposition to the use of guns.  Quaker attitudes toward 
self-defense and guns are a bit more complex than Justice Scalia’s account 
suggests.  Friends acted as magistrates and justices of the peace in 
Pennsylvania and were responsible for keeping the peace (peace officers 
were not always armed in the Founding era, so it is not clear if Quakers 
would have ever been armed in this context).  The orthodox interpretation 
of the Quaker Peace Testimony categorically prohibited any “war-like” 
action of any kind.  Quakers took the ideal of peace and harmony seriously 
and could be disciplined by their local meeting for offenses as minor as 
striking another individual or spreading malicious gossip.  Yet, the use of 
guns by Quakers was never an issue for Friends.  Indeed, the distinguished 
 
 105. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
(1998).  For critiques, see Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1913, 1919–22 (2006), and Soames, supra note 11, at 42–43. 
 106. See Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory:  District of 
Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371 (2009); Wilkinson, supra 
note 6.  The temporal distortions of Heller are discussed in Siegel, supra note 6. 
 107. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 590 (2008). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Scalia’s reference to gun fighting Quakers is bizarre and profoundly anachronistic.  
On the importance of the “gun fighter” myth in modern Hollywood Westerns, see RICHARD 
SLOTKIN, REGENERATION THROUGH VIOLENCE:  THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN 
FRONTIER, 1600–1860 (2000).  The gun fighter became one of the most powerful and iconic 
images to emerge in post-war America cinema.  Interestingly, Quakers figure prominently in 
two of the most popular and celebrated westerns of this period:  John Wayne’s Angel and the 
Badman, and Gary Cooper and Grace Kelly’s High Noon.  In Angel and the Badman, John 
Wayne plays a gun fighter who becomes involved with a family of Quakers and ultimately 
gives up his gun. ANGEL AND THE BADMAN (Republic Pictures 1947).  In High Noon, Gary 
Cooper is saved by Grace Kelly, his Quaker wife, who rejects her faith’s nonviolence and 
takes up a gun to save her husband. HIGH NOON (Universal Pictures 1952). 
 110. See RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE 92 (2009). 
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Quaker historian Jack Marrieta notes that neither the Disciplinary Rules of 
the Friends nor the extant records of the sect’s monthly meetings in 
Pennsylvania reveal any evidence that Friends were ever disciplined for 
owning or using firearms outside of the context of militia service.111  
Quakers owned guns for a variety of different purposes, including pest 
control and hunting.112  In revolutionary-era North Carolina, a well-known 
Quaker gunsmith attracted some notoriety when he tried to buy back guns 
he had sold to his neighbors to prevent them from being used for military 
purposes.113  Thus, Quaker belief posed no challenge to bearing a gun in a 
variety of contexts, but it absolutely prohibited Friends from bearing arms.  
The use of a gun or any weapon in legal self-defense was a more complex 
religious question for Quakers, but one that would have been dealt with 
internally by Friends within the forum of the monthly meeting.114  There 
would have been no reason for Quakers to petition their government for an 
exemption from being forced to use a gun in self-defense.  The right of self-
defense was well established at common law, and the decision to use a gun 
to defend oneself was a private one.  Justice Scalia clearly confused Quaker 
theology with the historical and legal reality faced by Quakers in 
Pennsylvania and other states. As a theological matter, Quaker opposition 
to violence derived from the New Testament’s belief that one ought to “turn 
the other cheek,” rather than meet violence with violence.  This was clearly 
not the issue Quakers were addressing in their repeated efforts to gain a 
religious exemption from bearing arms from individual states and 
eventually from Congress.  Quakers were seeking to avoid involvement 
with the military.115 
Justice Scalia violates an elementary rule of any sound historical inquiry:  
he substitutes his own views of the motivations behind Quaker action and 
belief for the Friends’ own account of their behavior and ideals.  Here is 
how one Quaker described the sect’s position on bearing arms to non-
 
 111. Posting of Jack Marietta, to Pennsylvania@h-net.msu.edu (Jan. 30, 2008) (on file 
with author); see also J.D. MARIETTA & G.S. ROWE, TROUBLED EXPERIMENT:  CRIME AND 
JUSTICE IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1682–1800, at 50 (2006) (concluding that levels of interpersonal 
violence within the Quaker communities of Pennsylvania were remarkably low and vindicate 
the Friend’s vision of themselves as a peaceful community). 
 112. See generally Kevin Sweeney, Firearms, Militias, and the Second Amendment, in 
SAUL CORNELL & NATHAN KOZUSKANICH, THE SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL:  CRITICAL 
ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER 310 (2013).  Quakers did oppose hunting for 
sport. 
 113. SETH HINSHAW, QUAKER INFLUENCES ON AMERICAN IDEALS:  AN OVERVIEW 17 
(1976). 
 114. Quakers did use arms to defend Indians during the Paxton uprising in 1763, a fact 
that prompted considerable commentary in the contemporary press and was addressed in the 
monthly meeting. See Nathan Kozuskanich, Defending Themselves:  The Original 
Understanding of the Right To Bear Arms, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1041, 1051–53 (2007). 
 115. In the colonial era, some colonies required individuals to bring guns to church.  See, 
e.g., 1631 Va. Acts 155.  No similar law was enacted in Pennsylvania where Quakers 
dominated politics for much of the colony’s history.  Indeed, Pennsylvania was the only 
colony without a militia for much of the colonial era. See Kozuskanich, supra note 114, at 
1048. 
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Quakers:  “We have a clear and strong Testimony to bear against Wars and 
Bloodshed; we cannot appear ourselves in Person, as Soldiers, Military 
Men, nor can we hire one another to or serve in our stead, neither comply 
with the Payment of any Fine or procure another Man to supply our 
Place.”116  This prohibition also extended to procuring items that might 
further the goals of warfare, including the purchase of “Drums, Colors, and 
other Military Attire.”  If one looks at documents intended strictly for 
consumption by other Quakers, the exclusive military focus of this concern 
is even more clearly articulated by Friends.  To enforce religious discipline 
within the Quaker meeting, Friends used a series of “Queries” designed to 
ascertain the level of conformity to Quaker teachings on a variety of issues.  
The Queries touched on belief and behavior, including attendance at 
meetings, abstinence from consumption of alcohol, demeanor in public, and 
care for the poor.  Although there was no discussion of private use of arms 
in the Queries, the question of military use was a major issue.  One set of 
Queries written and distributed to monthly meetings throughout New 
England makes this clear:  “Do you maintain a faithful testimony against 
the payment of priests [sic] wages, bearing of arms, training, or other 
military matters?”  Quakers clearly understood bearing arms to refer to 
military matters exclusively.117  Nor was this understanding limited to 
members of the Society of Friends.  When the subject came up in the press, 
this issue dominated discussion.  One of the clearest expressions of this 
concern may be found in an essay authored shortly after ratification of the 
Constitution.  It addressed the need for an amendment to the Constitution to 
protect the militia and responded to Quaker demands for an exemption to 
bearing arms: 
I am, and ever have been a decided friend to the principle of not 
compelling men to fight, who are from religious principles averse to 
bearing arms, but it would be improper to have an article to that purpose 
in the frame of government; it ought merely to be part of the militia law, 
and a precise definition should be made of what should really be deemed 
conscientious scruples, such as being actually in unity with the Quakers, 
Methodists, Menonists, Dunkers, or some other society, who are really 
conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms. — Then people cannot 
pretend to conscientious qualms, in case of invasion or insurrection, 
merely as a cloak to conceal their cowardice.118 
Quakers did not fear that the state would force them to take up a gun to 
protect their homes or meeting houses, but Quakers did fear that they would 
be forced to serve in the militia or pay a fee or fine in place of such service.  
There is simply no evidence that Quakers or anyone in the Founding era 
understood the notion of being religiously scrupulous about bearing arms to 
 
 116. A COLLECTION OF SOME WRITINGS OF THE MOST NOTED OF THE PEOPLE CALLED 
QUAKERS 6 (Phila., W. & T. Bradford 1767). 
 117. The queries were reprinted as a broadside. NEW ENG. YEARLY MEETING OF FRIENDS, 
QUERIES (1782), available at http://triptych.brynmawr.edu/cdm/ref/collection/SC_Broad/
id/872. 
 118. PENN. PACKET, September 10, 1789, at 4. 
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be anything other than a concern over militia service or other involvement 
with the military.  
Justice Scalia also distorts the interpretive conventions familiar to 
eighteenth-century authors and readers of the Second Amendment.  The 
first clause in the Amendment not only referenced “[a] well regulated 
Militia,”119 but the clause was framed as a preamble.  The use of preambles 
in legal texts was quite common in the Founding era.120  In Heller, Justice 
Scalia detached the purpose stated in the preamble from the rest of the 
Amendment’s text, claiming that “a prologue can be used only to clarify an 
ambiguous operative provision.”121  The justification for approaching legal 
texts in this manner comes not from Founding-era sources or practices, but 
from a set of legal rules elaborated by two nineteenth-century authors of 
legal treatises written over a half a century after the Second Amendment 
was framed and adopted.122  Justice Scalia literally read the text of the 
Second Amendment backwards, setting aside the meaning of the preamble 
until he arrives at his preferred reading of the enacting clause.  Indeed, 
Justice Scalia not only read the text of the Amendment backwards, he read 
history backwards, drawing on interpretive canons elaborated in texts 
written decades after the Second Amendment’s composition to unravel how 
Americans in the Founding era would have understood the right to bear 
arms.123  Approaching history and texts backwards lends Scalia’s Heller 
opinion an Alice in Wonderland quality.124 
It seems odd that Justice Scalia does not cite any of the Founding-era 
cases on preambles.  One might have thought that Supreme Court Justice 
John Jay’s summary of the relevant rule of construction regarding 
preambles would have been highly relevant to the facts before the Court in 
Heller:  “A preamble cannot annul enacting clauses; but when it evinces the 
intention of the legislature and the design of the act, it enables us, in cases 
of two constructions, to adopt the one most consonant to their intention and 
design.”125  According to Jay, a preamble may not be used to abrogate the 
text, but in cases in which two competing readings of the text are proffered, 
 
 119. U.S. CONST. amend. II, cl. 1. 
 120. Historian David Konig notes that the only case Scalia cites is an early eighteenth-
century English case that had come into some disrepute. Konig, supra note 6. 
 121. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 578 n.4 (2008). 
 122. See JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR 
INTERPRETATION § 51 (Bos., Little, Brown 1882); FORTUNATUS DWARRIS, A GENERAL 
TREATISE ON STATUTES 268–69 (P. Potter ed., N.Y.C., William Gould & Sons 1871); 
THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND 
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 42–45 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 
1980) (2d ed. 1874). 
 123. Justice Scalia’s approach to preambles employs a “Cheshire Cat Rule of 
Construction”:  now you see the preamble, now you don’t.  For a discussion of this feature of 
Heller’s Alice in Wonderland methodology, see Cornell, supra note 98. 
 124. Ironically, in Heller, Justice Scalia chided Justice Stevens for his Alice in 
Wonderland methodology. See Heller, 554 U.S.  at 570. 
 125. Jay’s view is developed in Jones v. Walker, 13 F. Cas. 1059, 1065 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) 
(No. 7,507).  The issue was also central to the resolution of Lloyd v. Urison, 2 N.J.L. 212, 
202 (Sup. Ct. 1807). 
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the preamble can be employed to illuminate the intention of the lawgiver 
and decide which meaning of a disputed text is more consistent with the 
purpose of the law. 
Jay’s view of preambles was hardly unique in the Founding era.  
Although Justice Scalia cites the Pennsylvania Constitution as good 
authority, he conspicuously ignores its detailed treatment of preambles.126 
To the end that laws before they are enacted may be more maturely 
considered, and the inconvenience of hasty determinations as much as 
possible prevented, all bills of public nature shall be printed for the 
consideration of the people, before they are read in general assembly the 
last time for debate and amendment; and, except on occasions of sudden 
necessity, shall not be passed into laws until the next session of assembly; 
and for the more perfect satisfaction of the public, the reasons and 
motives for making such laws shall be fully and clearly expressed in the 
preambles.127 
In his manual on parliamentary procedure, Thomas Jefferson also favored 
the use of preambles as a guide to interpreting statutes.128  Finally, the most 
popular lay guide to the law, a text published in multiple editions and 
available in most of the new states, the Conductor Generalis, included a 
brief guide to interpreting statutes.  Among the rules it reprinted were Lord 
Coke’s maxim:  “The preamble or rehearsal of a statute is deemed true:  and 
therefore good argument may be drawn from the preamble.”129  The 
dominant approach to preambles in the Founding era does not support 
Justice Scalia’s backwards reading of the Second Amendment. 
There are many lessons to be drawn from Heller’s tortured use of 
evidence.  Rather than vindicate public meaning originalism, Heller shows 
that its methods are easily manipulated and prone to abuse.  Heller 
demonstrates the danger of focusing on a disembodied “public meaning” 
hovering somewhere in the constitutional ether.  Public meaning 
originalism makes it far too easy for ideologically motivated judges and 
lawyers to consciously or unconsciously manipulate the text to suit their 
political agendas.130 
 
 126. Heller, 554 U.S. at 584–85. 
 127. PA. CONST. of 1776 § 15 (emphasis added). 
 128. THOMAS JEFFERSON, MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE:  FOR THE USE OF THE 
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 79 (Wash. City, Samuel Harrison Smith 1801). 
 129. RICHARD BURN & JAMES PARKER, THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, OR, THE OFFICE, 
DUTY & AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, HIGH-SHERIFFS, UNDER-SHERIFFS, 
CORONERS, CONSTABLES, GAOLERS, JURY-MEN, & OVERSEERS OF THE POOR (Phila., Matthew 
Carey 1801).  The fact that the two leading proponents of “original methods” originalism 
endorsed this erroneous view of Founding-era practice only underscores the problems with 
the method. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 2, at 
767. 
 130. By shifting attention away from individuals and particular groups, such as Framers 
and ratifiers, public meaning originalism actually facilitates the manipulation of evidence by 
allowing scholars to engage in more subtle forms of manipulation. See generally Richard S. 
Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 703 (2009). 
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III. HISTORICAL PRAGMATICS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 
IN 1787–88:  THE ORIGINAL DEBATE OVER FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
The best way to illustrate the method of historical pragmatics is to 
examine a specific Founding-era example.  A substantial modern scholarly 
literature on the meaning of  “freedom of the press” has developed over the 
last two generations.  One case that typically appears as a footnote in this 
story, Respublica v. Oswald,131 merits further attention because it affords a 
rare glimpse into Founding-era conflict over how to read constitutional 
texts.132 
As news of ratification spread in the summer of 1788, the outspoken 
Pennsylvania Anti-Federalist printer Eleazer Oswald became embroiled in a 
libel case when he attacked Federalist Andrew Brown in the pages of his 
newspaper, The Independent Gazetteer, or The Chronicle of Freedom.  The 
Pennsylvania case of Respublica v. Oswald took several unexpected legal 
turns before being resolved, including a controversial contempt citation of 
Oswald and an unsuccessful attempt by Oswald to impeach Chief Justice 
Thomas McKean, the presiding judge in the case.133  The unusual twists in 
the case prompted a much more extensive discussion of constitutional 
questions in the press, and the issues raised by the case eventually reached 
beyond the courts to the halls of the Pennsylvania state house, where the 
legislature considered a petition to impeach Chief Justice McKean.134  
Although it was adjudicated under state law and did not directly involve 
any legal issues presented by the new federal Constitution, the controversy 
engendered by the case illuminates the pragmatic processes in play when 
Americans tried to make sense of constitutional texts.  Indeed, the Oswald 
case was the first significant public debate over the general principles of 
constitutional interpretation to occur in the wake of the adoption of the 
federal Constitution, and merits further scrutiny for that reason alone. 
Ratification in Pennsylvania had been exceedingly contentious.  The 
Pennsylvania press teemed with criticism and defenses of the Constitution.  
Crowds took to the streets on multiple occasions to vent their frustrations, 
affirm their own political views, and on several occasions engage in violent 
protest, including burning James Wilson in effigy.  The state ratification 
 
 131. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319 (Pa. 1788). 
 132. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985) (discussing the case but 
making several errors in describing the facts and the holding in the case); see also NORMAN 
L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MAN:  AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF 
LIBEL (1990); JEFFERY ALAN SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM:  THE IDEOLOGY OF 
EARLY AMERICAN JOURNALISM (1988).  For an interesting critique of historical scholarship 
on this topic by a prominent legal scholar, see David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian:  
Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795 
(1985).  Rabban’s critique of Levy makes a strong case that historians can easily fall into the 
trap of writing law office history. Id. 
 133. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 326. 
 134. The case report was also published as a pamphlet. See, e.g., A Gentleman of the Law, 
in THE CASE OF THE COMMONWEALTH AGAINST ELEAZER OSWALD (Phila., William 
Spotswood 1788). 
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convention also witnessed a number of dramatic moments as Federalists 
and Anti-Federalists clashed over the Constitution.135 
Anti-Federalists pounced on the absence of a bill of rights as a serious 
flaw in the Constitution and were particularly troubled by the Constitution’s 
failure to expressly protect freedom of the press.  In his widely reprinted 
State House Speech, James Wilson argued that the Constitution did not 
need a bill of rights.  He also derided fears that the Constitution threatened 
freedom of the press as absurd. Anti-Federalists rejected Wilson’s 
arguments, including his suggestion that the Constitution posed no threat to 
freedom of the press.  Writing as “[a]n Officer of the Late Continental 
Army,” Anti-Federalist William Findley identified the use of libel as a 
particularly effective tool to destroy freedom of the press and stifle political 
dissent.  In the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, Wilson responded to 
this argument by invoking Sir William Blackstone’s analysis of the law of 
libel.  Wilson reminded his audience, “What is meant by the liberty of the 
press is, that there should be no antecedent restraint upon it; but that every 
author is responsible when he attacks the security or welfare of the 
government, or the safety, character, and property of the individual.”136 
Findley became Wilson’s most vocal opponent in the state ratification 
convention.  Each man approached the process of constitutional 
interpretation from a radically different set of assumptions about how one 
ought to read constitutional texts.  The two sparred frequently on the floor 
of the convention.  One of the most dramatic moments in the convention 
occurred during one of these verbal tussles.  Findley claimed that Sweden 
had once enjoyed the right of trial by jury but had lost it.  Wilson mocked 
Findley’s claim as preposterous.  Angered by Wilson’s arrogance, Findley, 
a weaver who had turned to the law and politics and had become a powerful 
figure in Pennsylvania, returned the next day and produced a volume of 
history and a volume of Blackstone to buttress his historical claims.  Rather 
than drop the issue and move on, Wilson snidely dismissed his opponent’s 
dramatic gesture as pretentious; he reminded the Convention that:  “I do not 
pretend to remember everything I read.”137  By contrast, his opponent was 
one “whose stock of knowledge” was “limited to a few items,” which meant 
he could “easily remember and refer to them.”138   
The sharp exchange between Wilson and Findley illustrates the profound 
rift between the legal vision of Federalist elites and a more popular 
democratic vision of law championed by backcountry Anti-Federalists.  
 
 135. MAIER, supra note 32. 
 136. James Wilson’s Speech in the State House Yard, in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 87, at 167, 168; The Pennsylvania 
Convention, Saturday, 1 December 1787, in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 87, at 444, 454–56 (statement of James 
Wilson); see also An Officer of the Late Continental Army, in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 87, at 211, 211. 
 137. See James Wilson’s Speech Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, supra note 136, 
at 528, 532, 551. 
 138. Id. 
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Wilson’s approach to the law was grounded in the traditions of Anglo-
American jurisprudence; Blackstone’s science of the law set out clear rules 
for interpreting legal texts.  Findley rejected this elite vision of the law.  His 
approach to constitutional interpretation was shaped by precepts drawn 
from Anti-Federalist popular constitutionalism.  To the extent that Findley 
found any use for texts such as Blackstone, it was not as a model of legal 
reasoning to be emulated, but as a simple reference work from which 
isolated facts could be extracted.  In this sense he viewed Blackstone as 
little different from a farmer’s almanac.  Wilson appreciated the vast 
difference that separated his vision of law from his opponent’s.  In the notes 
Wilson kept of the convention debates, he aptly summarized Findley’s 
fundamental objection to the Constitution:  “the system ought to speak for 
itself; and not need explanations.”139  From Wilson’s point of view, 
Findley’s approach to constitutional texts was simply untenable.  The law 
never spoke for itself; law always required the application of a set of 
interpretive canons.  In good Enlightenment fashion, Wilson saw the law as 
a science and mastery of it, including the new Constitution, presupposed a 
familiarity with a well-established body of rules and methods gleaned from 
a close study of legal decisions.  Blackstone and others had attempted to 
systematize this science of the law, and rough-hewn democrats, including 
Findley, simply failed to appreciate that the law required considerably more 
than a competency in English to master.  In short, from Wilson’s elite 
perspective, Findley’s radical textualism was antithetical to orthodox legal 
practices in both England and America. 
In contrast to the recently ratified federal Constitution that contained no 
declaration of rights, the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution contained a 
provision protecting freedom of the press.  Pennsylvania’s provision read:  
“That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing, and 
publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to 
be restrained.”140  Among Pennsylvania printers, Oswald had emerged as 
one of the state’s most ardent defenders of an expansive vision of this right.  
Indeed, his aggressive advocacy for press freedom had landed him in 
McKean’s court on libel charges in 1782.  On that earlier occasion he had 
avoided prosecution by appealing to a sympathetic grand jury that refused 
to indict him.  In 1788, Oswald once again faced his old enemy Justice 
McKean, and had things gone according to plan, the jury might once again 
have saved the printer.  It might have worked out exactly as it had in 1782, 
but Oswald overplayed his hand and published an attack on McKean while 
his case moved to trial.  McKean cited him for contempt, effectively 
depriving him of a chance to make his case before a jury.141 
 
 139. James Wilson’s Notes on Speech of William Findley, in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 87, at 506.  For a discussion 
of the contrast between Findley’s popular vision of the law and Wilson’s more elitist views, 
see Cornell, supra note 90, at 323. 
 140. PA. CONST. of 1776 art. XII. 
 141. See generally Cornell, supra note 98 (discussing this case). 
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Although the 1788 Oswald case technically focused on the scope of 
contempt under Pennsylvania law, Justice McKean used the opportunity to 
expound on what freedom of the press meant in Pennsylvania.  In matters of 
constitutional interpretation, McKean was a strong intentionalist.  The 
“meaning of the [language of the] Constitution,” he intoned, was to be 
sought in “its spirit and intention.”142  Oswald and his supporters had used 
considerable “ingenuity” to “torture the expressions.”143  The proper 
understanding of freedom of the press, the true meaning of these words 
could only be ascertained when one applied the correct canons of 
construction that had been elaborated by learned English commentators 
such as Blackstone.  These rules instructed judges to look first to the words 
of the law, and then to follow a prescribed series of rules to ascertain the 
intention of the lawgiver.  McKean also shared the Federalist view that the 
language of the law had to be read against a set of background legal 
assumptions, which were well “settled in England, so far back as the reign 
of William the Third.”144 
The interpretive rules and assumptions McKean extolled in court were 
also defended by Federalist lawyer William Lewis when Oswald brought 
his case before the Pennsylvania legislature.  Infuriated by McKean’s 
imperious behavior, Oswald demanded McKean’s impeachment for 
violating the constitution of the state.145  Lewis defended the Chief Justice 
against Oswald’s attacks, beginning his disquisition by “rescu[ing] Sir 
William Blackstone from the stigma of being a courtly writer.”146  
Oswald’s paper had reviled Federalists for invoking the authority of the 
notorious Tory-leaning judge.147  Having absolved Blackstone of the charge 
of being hostile to American liberty, Lewis provided “a historical narrative” 
demonstrating that the intent of Pennsylvanians in framing such a provision 
in their own constitution had been clear:  to protect the traditional 
understanding of freedom of the press inherited from English law.  In 
addition to the arguments that McKean had proffered in court, Lewis 
invoked another interpretive principle derived from Blackstone:  he 
identified the baneful consequences that would flow from the opposing rule 
of construction favored by Oswald.  Moving beyond intention, to identify 
the potentially negative “effect and consequences” of Oswald’s Anti-
 
 142. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 325 (Pa. 1788). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Blackstone’s rule was as follows:   
The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by 
exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the most 
natural and probable.  And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject 
matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law.  
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59.  In addition, Blackstone counseled, “Lastly, 
the most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the 
words are dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it; or the cause which moved the 
legislator to enact it.” Id. at *59–61. 
 146. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 329 n.(a). 
 147. See generally Cornell, supra note 12 (discussing the press debate). 
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Federalist approach to interpreting the law, Lewis claimed that his 
opponents’ legal method would “prostitute to the most ignoble purposes” 
the venerable idea of freedom of the press and produce licentiousness, not 
liberty.148 
Oswald’s champion in the legislature was William Findley, who rejected 
virtually every aspect of his Federalist opponents’ Blackstonian method.  
Findley was a strong textualist, who resolved to stick to the “explicit 
language of the text.”149  In his view, formal legal knowledge was not 
necessary to understand constitutional texts.150  “Every man,” Findley 
asserted, “who possessed a competent share of common sense, and 
understood the rules of grammar, was able to determine, on a bare perusal 
of the bill of rights and constitution” what its words meant.151  To interpret 
a constitution, one need simply have the ability to read ordinary English.  
Federalists, by contrast, applied the  “jargon of the law,” an approach 
Findley believed perverted the plain meaning of the text.152  “If it was once 
established, that the technical learning of a lawyer is necessary to 
comprehend the principles laid down in the great political compact between 
the people and their rulers,” such a development, would “be fatal, indeed, to 
the cause of liberty.”153  American constitutionalism was not heir to British 
ideas about freedom of the press, but rather marked a clean break with 
English legal ideas.  The presuppositions that guided Findley’s approach to 
constitutional interpretation were an interlocking set of democratic 
principles:  the Revolution marked a sharp break with English law and the 
interpretation of constitutions required no technical knowledge of the law.  
The gulf separating Findley’s popular constitutional vision from the 
orthodox Blackstonian vision of the law defended by Federalist elites 
including James Wilson, Thomas McKean, and William Lewis, was 
enormous.154 
Most originalists have simply assumed the existence of a broad 
consensus on questions of constitutional meaning and interpretation during 
the Founding era.  Historical scholarship over the last fifty years, by 
contrast, has demonstrated that conflict, not consensus, was the norm in this 
period.155  The historical divisions within the Founding generation also 
encompassed profound disagreements over the most basic questions about 
how to read constitutional texts.156  The controversy over the meaning of 
freedom of the press in Pennsylvania supports the idea that there was no 
interpretive consensus on the most basic issues of constitutional 
 
 148. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 329 n.(b). 
 149. Id. at 329 n.(e). 
 150. See id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 329 n.(e). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 329. 
 155. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 156. Treanor, Against Textualism, supra note 4, at 1006. 
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interpretation in the Founding era.157  If one moves beyond the borders of 
Pennsylvania and recognizes that thinking about constitutional 
interpretation was evolving in the 1790s, the prospect of identifying any 
constitutional consensus on such matters seems unlikely.158 
A number of originalists have argued that we ought to read the 
Constitution’s text from the perspective of a fully informed or rational 
lawyer.  The notion that we might identify a single interpretive paradigm 
that such an informed lawyer would have employed when reading 
constitutional texts seems illusionary.  James Wilson and William Findley 
were both lawyers, but each figure approached constitutional interpretation 
from a different set of assumptions about the law.  Wilson was indisputably 
the better-educated lawyer, and Wilson’s career in the law would likely be 
viewed as more illustrious than Findley’s, at least if one uses the 
conventional measures that the modern legal profession esteems.  Wilson 
attended one of the leading universities in the English-speaking world, St. 
Andrews in Scotland.  He held a prestigious professorship in law at the 
University of Pennsylvania, and became an Associate Justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  Yet, taking one’s interpretive cues from the Federalist 
Wilson, one of the finest legal minds in America, produces some odd, if not 
ironic, outcomes.  An originalist interpretation using Wilson as a model 
would inevitably be forced to conclude that prosecutions for seditious libel 
were perfectly consistent with the original meaning of freedom of the press.  
By contrast, following the methodology of the less well-educated Anti-
Federalist William Findley leads to a result closer to the accepted modern 
doctrine and more consistent with a view most modern Americans would 
likely endorse.159  Thus, in the case of freedom of the press, interpreting the 
Federalist Constitution with Findley’s more democratic and less “lawyerly” 
methodology actually produces better results than using the methods of the 
better-educated and decidedly more legalistic Federalist James Wilson.160  
An interpretive methodology built on the methods of the Anti-Federalist 
 
 157. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 519 (2003); Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, supra note 4. 
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interpretive models.  Adding developments within the 1790s complicates matters even 
further.  One of the most important developments in this period was Madison’s evolving 
theory of ratifier intent. See generally Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of 
Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77 (1988); Jack N. Rakove, The Original Intention of 
Original Understanding, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 159 (1996). 
 159. This example casts further doubt on the claims of McGinnis and Rappaport that 
originalism yields desirable outcomes.  A neutral application of originalist methods actually 
produces highly undesirable outcomes. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A 
Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 388 (2007); John O. McGinnis 
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 160. Anti-Federalists’ views on freedom of the press were not monolithic.  Findley 
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emphasis on the rights of juries to determine the facts and the law.  For the diversity of Anti-
Federalist thought on this issue, see CORNELL, supra note 12, at 121–136. 
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losers applied to a Constitution written and ratified by the victorious 
Federalists leads to a jurisprudence that would have been historically 
impossible to implement in either 1788 or 1791.  While one might justify 
interpreting the Federalist Constitution with Anti-Federalist techniques, it 
would be hard to defend a claim that this was the dominant original 
understanding that prevailed in the Founding era.  Originalists seem 
unaware of this Anti-Federalist paradox. 
Discussions of originalism often speak of a “Brown problem.”  Any 
viable theory of constitutional law that does not vindicate Brown v. Board 
of Education must be cast aside as defective.161  Originalism not only 
suffers from a Brown problem, it also suffers from a serious First 
Amendment problem as well.  Applying originalist theory in an 
intellectually honest and historically rigorous fashion leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that most of modern First Amendment doctrine is 
incompatible with the original understanding of freedom of the press.162 
IV.  THE LIMITS OF ORIGINALISM AS A SCHOLARLY METHODOLOGY 
What, if any, significance does the intellectual history critique of 
originalism, especially new originalism, mean for normative questions of 
constitutional theory?  Despite ambitious claims made by new originalists 
that they have solved many of the historical problems associated with 
traditional originalism, many of these problems persist.  If anything, the 
shift to a focus on original public meaning has exacerbated these problems.  
New originalism has made it easier, not harder, for scholars and judges to 
manipulate evidence.  Neither the recent turn to the philosophy of language 
nor the use of fictive readers has solved any of the serious historical 
problems associated with traditional intentionalist variants of 
originalism.163 
 
 161. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 82 (1990); Alexander M. Bickel, 
The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 56 (1955); 
David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1161 (2012); see also 
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 
(1995) (providing an originalist defense of Brown). But see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, 
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory:  A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 1881 (1995) (opposing McConnell’s view). 
 162. There is a vast literature on the First Amendment and originalism.  For a useful 
overview that concludes that the modern doctrine is hard to reconcile with any neutral 
application of originalism, see Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the 
Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1 (2011).  
Originalism would undermine many other well-established features of modern constitutional 
law. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two 
About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 392–93 (2007). 
 163. The profound flaws in new originalism have prompted more than one scholar to 
quote the lyrics of the rock band The Who’s generational anthem, “Won’t Get Fooled 
Again,” which offered this prophetic critique:  “Meet the new boss, same as the old boss.” 
SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES  E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:  THE BASIC 
QUESTIONS 94 (2007) (quoting THE WHO, Won’t Get Fooled Again, on WHO’S NEXT (MCA 
Records 1971); Cornell, supra note 98 (same). 
2013] THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY ALTERNATIVE 755 
 
If legal scholars and judges wish to continue to make serious claims 
about what the Constitution meant in the Founding era, they will need to 
master the basic methods of intellectual history. Jettisoning originalism in 
favor of a method grounded in intellectual history will not eliminate all 
ideological distortion.  Better history will not end results-oriented judging, 
but it will facilitate a more honest and intellectually rigorous discussion 
about what various provisions of the Constitution meant to different legal 
audiences in the Founding era.164  Deciding which, if any, of these different 
historically grounded interpretations ought to guide us when interpreting the 
Constitution today is not a question that history can answer.  These choices 
are inescapably philosophical or political decisions.  Until originalists 
embrace a truly historical approach, originalism will continue to be little 
more than an ideology masquerading as a methodology. 
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